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)
)
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)
)
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)
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)
)
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)
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BINGHAM COUNTY NO. CR06-19-3665

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
During one of many attacks,

Andrew Young threw

Isabelle Jolley into the kitchen sink, leaving her cut and bleeding. Fortunately, after this latest
attack, Mr. Young was arrested and charged with domestic battery. However, to Ms. Jolley’s
horror, Mr. Young received only misdemeanor charges and he was released to continue his
abuse. After hearing the news, Ms. Jolley feared an onslaught of further violence and
harassment, and simply lost it. The abuse had to stop. She initially planned to take her own life to
cease the abuse. But, she wanted him to see it. As she approached Mr. Young, she turned the gun
on her abuser. The gun did not fire though. As Ms. Jolley stood shocked, Mr. Young snatched
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the gun from her, chased her down as she tried to flee for her life, and shot her. Based on these
events, Ms. Jolley was the one who was charged with attempted murder.
Eventually, the charges were reduced and Ms. Jolley pleaded guilty aggravated assault
with an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. The district court sentenced her to fifteen
years, with five years determinate. Ms. Jolley filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the
district court denied. Ms. Jolley timely appealed from both her judgment of conviction and the
order denying her Rule 35 motion. On appeal she argues the district court abused its discretion
twice: (1) by imposing an excessive sentence and (2) by denying her Rule 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Isabelle Jolley, a child raised in abuse and trauma, moved back to
Idaho with

Andrew Young. (Conf. Doc. pp.12-13.) Mr. Young was

Ms. Jolley’s sister’s friend, and drove to Kansas to pick up Ms. Jolley. (Conf. Doc., p.10.)
Ms. Jolley moved in with Mr. Young and they began a relationship, which quickly turned
violent. (Conf. Doc., pp.10, 46-48.) Mr. Young yelled at Ms. Jolley, called her insulting names,
belittled her, pushed her, threw objects at her, threw her into walls, beat her dog, and attacked her
mother. (Conf. Doc., pp.10, 14, 46-48; Tr., p.39, Ls.17-21, p.42, L.25 – p.43, L.8.) During one
violent outburst, Mr. Young threw Ms. Jolley into the kitchen sink. (Conf. Doc., p.46.) The
impact cut Ms. Jolley’s knees. (Conf. Doc., p.46.) Ms. Jolley finally built the courage to stand up
to her abuser, and she called for help. (Conf. Doc., p.46.) Police arrested Mr. Young and charged
him with domestic battery. (Conf. Doc., p.10; Tr., p.39, L.24 – p.40, L.3.)
While Mr. Young was incarcerated, Ms. Jolley believed she would have a little reprieve
from her constant distress as she continued to live in Mr. Young’s trailer. (Conf. Doc., p.47.) Her
freedom from fear was short-lived, however, as Mr. Young’s family began threatening her.
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(Conf. Doc., p.47.) Ms. Jolley again became scared for her safety and moved her belongings into
her car. (Conf. Doc., p.47.) While living out of her car, Ms. Jolley received a phone call
revealing that Mr. Young was only charged with misdemeanors and was being released, so he
would not be punished and she would not be protected. (Conf. Doc., p.47.)
A couple weeks later, the torment began again. (Conf. Doc., p.47.) Ms. Jolley received
two phone calls from police that she was reported to have stolen Mr. Young’s possessions and
mistreated her own dog. (Conf. Doc., pp.10, 47; Tr., p.45, L.21 – p.46, L.1.) Ms. Jolley knew it
was Mr. Young “trying to cause hell in her life and control[] her.” (Conf. Doc., p.47.) Ms. Jolley
also believed Mr. Young was spreading rumors that she was a child molester. (Conf. Doc., p.48.)
About this time, Ms. Jolley lost her medical insurance (Conf. Doc., pp.46-47), and could not
afford medication or treatment to manage her bipolar disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and depression.
(Conf. Doc., pp.15-16, 52-53; R., p.102.)
To stop Mr. Young’s abuse, Ms. Jolley determined to take her own life. (Conf. Doc.,
p.48.) Ms. Jolley dropped her dog off at her father’s house, took a gun from her father’s gun case
– though no ammunition – and left. (Conf. Doc., pp.48, 51.) Ms. Jolley felt unsafe and did not
want to let someone who hurt her control her life any more. (Conf. Doc., p.48.) Ms. Jolley
decided to “sleep on it,” to make sure she wanted to die rather than endure the abuse, and went to
her sister’s house to take a nap. (Conf. Doc., pp.48, 51.) Upon waking, Ms. Jolley was resolute –
she needed to stop Mr. Young’s abuse, and the way to do it was to kill herself. (Conf. Doc.,
pp.48, 51, 53.) As an afterthought, she felt that Mr. Young should witness her dying so he
understood that he was the reason for her death. (Conf. Doc., pp.51, 53.)
As Ms. Jolley entered Mr. Young’s trailer and approached Mr. Young’s bedroom, she
began to question her decision. (Conf. Doc., p.50.) She entered the room, and instead of killing
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herself, she pointed the gun at Mr. Young and pulled the trigger. (Conf. Doc., p.50.) The gun did
not fire. (Conf. Doc., p.50.) Mr. Young knocked the gun out of Ms. Jolley’s hand. (Conf. Doc.,
p.49.) Ms. Jolley turned and ran to escape with Mr. Young chasing after her; the gun now in his
hand. (Conf. Doc., p.49.) As Ms. Jolley ran frantically to her car, Mr. Young rapidly fired at
Ms. Jolley. (Conf. Doc., p.49.) Ms. Jolley hopped into her car, as Mr. Young continued to shoot
at her from the porch of his trailer. (Conf. Doc., p.49.) He shot out a window, spraying glass at
Ms. Jolley and cutting her head. (Conf. Doc., pp.49, 55.) Mr. Young also shot through the car
door, driving a bullet into her leg. (Conf. Doc., p.49.)
Ms. Jolley drove away, unsure of what to do. (Conf. Doc., p.49.) While Ms. Jolley was
driving, a medic called her phone and told her an ambulance was on its way. (Conf. Doc., p.50.)
Ms. Jolley stopped at a nearby gas station, awaiting help. (Conf. Doc., p.49.)
While at the hospital, with nurses tending her gunshot wound, Ms. Jolley gave her
account of the incident to police. (Conf. Doc., pp.49-55.) Ms. Jolley’s version matched police
accounts and Mr. Young’s account. (Tr., p.55, Ls.13-25.) Because Ms. Jolley was shot, and in
light of the pending domestic battery charges against Mr. Young and the no-contact order
protecting Ms. Jolley, the police initially believed she was the victim. (Conf. Doc., pp.40, 48, 57,
59, 75.) However, as Ms. Jolley told her story, the officer decided to read Ms. Jolley her
Miranda1 rights (Conf. Doc., pp.47-48), and she was later charged with attempted murder.
(R., p.9.)
Throughout the case, Ms. Jolley repeatedly requested to be released on her own
recognizance, or alternatively to have her bond reduced. (Tr., pp.25, 60, 64, 72.) In support of
her last request, Ms. Jolley submitted her medical and mental health records and letters from her

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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father and grandmother, discussing her good character and their support. (R., pp.79-80.) It was
not until she pleaded guilty that she was released. (Tr., p.29, Ls.24-25.)
When Ms. Jolley eventually pleaded guilty to aggravated assault (Tr., p.15, Ls.6-9) with
an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon (Tr., p.16, L.22 – p.16, L.1), she requested the court
order a full psychological evaluation in her guilty plea advisory form. (R., p.108.) Ms. Jolley also
told the court she believed her psychological issues would be of significance in her case before
she entered her guilty plea. (Tr., p.6, Ls.21-23.)
The district court accepted Ms. Jolley’s guilty plea (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-11); however, it did
not order a psychological evaluation. (See Tr., p.11, Ls.11-14.) Rather, the district court ordered
the standard presentence investigation report, informing Ms. Jolley it would “reveal[] any prior
criminal history” (Tr., p.11, Ls.5-7), and the GAIN-I evaluation, “to determine if you have any
mental health issues or any substance abuse issues.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-14.) After pleading guilty,
Ms. Jolley was released to her father’s house, provided she wear an ankle monitor. (Tr., p.31,
Ls.10-12.) Ms. Jolley was compliant with all terms of her release. (Tr., p.30, Ls.3-9.)
Ms. Jolley participated in both the PSI and GAIN-I evaluation. (See generally Conf.
Docs.) Both the PSI report and the GAIN-I evaluation repeatedly stated that Ms. Jolley suffers
from bipolar disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and depression, that she takes prescription medications to
manage those conditions, and that she sees a mental health professional. (See, e.g., Conf. Docs.,
pp.15-16, 19, 22, 83, 88.) The GAIN-I evaluation recommended Level 1 outpatient treatment
(Conf. Doc., p.88), which would only be possible if Ms. Jolley were to be placed on probation.
Following her guilty plea, Ms. Jolley was accepted into drug court. (Tr., p.58, Ls.3-10.)
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Jolley presented argument regarding the overwhelming
mitigating factors. (Tr., p.45, L.16 – p.54, L.13.) Because of these mitigating factors, Ms. Jolley
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requested probation and participation in drug court. (Tr., p.54, Ls.5-15.) The prosecutor
recommended the court retain jurisdiction (Tr., p.57, Ls.15-17), and called attention to
Ms. Jolley’s youthfulness and her cooperation, acceptance of responsibility, and honesty with
police during their investigation. (Tr., p.54, L.19 – p.55, L.25.) The district court exceeded both
recommendations and sentenced Ms. Jolley to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years
determinate, without retaining jurisdiction. (Tr., p.64, Ls.3-9.)
Ms. Jolley timely filed a Rule 35(b) motion. (R., pp.155-57.) Attached to the motion were
her mental health records and several letters of support from her family and friends.2 (R., pp.1576.) The district court denied the motion. (Aug., pp.1-6.3) Ms. Jolley timely appeals from both
the judgment of conviction and the order denying her Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.137, 150.)

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of
fifteen years, with five years determinate, upon Ms. Jolley following her guilty plea.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Jolley’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence.

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence Upon Ms. Jolley
Following Her Guilty Plea
Ms. Jolley argues that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of fifteen years,
with five years determinate, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
2

The letters of support filed in support of Ms. Jolley’s Rule 35 motion were different than the
letters of support filed in support of her motion for reduction of bond. (Compare R., pp.98-99,
with R., pp.161-65.)
3
A Motion to Augment Record with the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Rule 35
Motion has been filed contemporaneously with this brief.
6

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). In determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate
review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019).
Here, Ms. Jolley’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 188005(6)(a) (ten year maximum); I.C. § 18-906 (five years maximum). Accordingly, to show the
sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Jolley “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Ms. Jolley asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of fifteen years,
with five years determinate, is excessive. The district court did not exercise reason because it
failed to adequately weigh the mitigating factors.
The mitigating factors in this case are overwhelming. At the time the offense occurred,
Isabelle Jolley was, and is, barely more than a child. (Tr., p.21, L.22.) See
State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980) (youth as mitigating factor). Ms. Jolley has no
prior criminal history. (Conf. Doc., p.1.) See I.C. 19-2521(g); State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836
(2011) (absence of a criminal record as mitigation)). In fact, Ms. Jolley’s only prior interaction
with the criminal justice system has been as a victim. As a juvenile, three men used Ms. Jolley as
a prostitute, and no-contact orders were entered to protect her from those men. (Conf. Doc.,
p.12.) Further, as mentioned above, and discussed in greater detail below, this case arose in the
context of an abusive relationship where Ms. Jolley was a domestic violence survivor, who put
her faith in the criminal justice system to protect her from Mr. Young, but was harassed and put
at further risk of violence when he was released from jail. (Conf. Doc., p.14.)
Though Ms. Jolley has a limited history with the criminal justice system, her history of
abuse is substantial for a person her age. As a child, she was physically and sexually abused by
her family. (Conf. Doc., pp.13, 16.) See State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001)
(troubled childhood as mitigation). As a juvenile, she was sexually exploited as a prostitute.
(Conf. Doc., p.12.) Then, at eighteen Mr. Young physically and emotionally abused her. (Conf.
Doc., p.14.) At a certain point, Ms. Jolley had enough abuse from Mr. Young and sought
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protection. (Conf. Doc., p.46.) Mr. Young was arrested for domestic battery. (Conf. Doc., pp.10,
41, 47.) While Mr. Young was in jail, however, his family threatened and harassed Ms. Jolley
until she moved to escape the abuse. (Conf. Doc., p.48.) When Mr. Young was released from jail
the abuse resumed, though by different means. (Conf. Doc., p.47.) Ms. Jolley began receiving
calls accusing her of stealing Mr. Young’s possessions and of abusing her dog. (Conf. Doc.,
p.47.) And rumors were circulating that she molested children. (Conf. Doc., pp.47-48.) Ms.
Jolley knew Mr. Young was the cause of this new torment. (Conf. Doc., pp.47-48.)
In addition, and as is often the case with abuse survivors, Ms. Jolley also engaged in selfharm and has had suicidal ideations. (Conf. Doc., p.9; Tr., p.53, L.15, p.62, Ls.4-5.) Ms. Jolley,
after a lifetime of abuse, resolved to end her short life in order to stop the endless abuse. (Conf.
Doc., p.48.) While not a defense, the fact that Ms. Jolley was mentally, physically, and
emotionally abused by, and because of, Mr. Young provides strong mitigation against the severe
sentence she received. I.C. § 19-2521(d).
Added to her long history of surviving abuse, Ms. Jolley suffers from serious mental
health conditions, including bipolar disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and depression. (Tr., p.53, Ls.1314.) See I.C. § 19-2523; see also State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (mental health as a
sentencing consideration). At the time of the offense, Ms. Jolley had lost her medical insurance
and could not afford treatment or medication for her mental health issues. (Conf. Doc., p.53.)
Further, Ms. Jolley’s initial intention was not to shoot Mr. Young. (Conf. Doc., pp.4548.) Instead, up until Ms. Jolley approached Mr. Young’s bedroom, her plan was to shoot
herself. (Conf. Doc., pp.50-53.) See State v. Moore, 127 Idaho 780, 185 (Ct. App. 1995)
(suggesting that sudden, uncontemplated, and impulsive act would be a mitigating circumstance
that perhaps calls for a sentence reduction). This fact coupled with her mental health condition,
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lack of medication, and harassment and torment by her abuser, provide strong mitigation under
the circumstances.
Further, after being shot, Ms. Jolley cooperated with officers and gave an accurate
explanation of the events that occurred. (Conf. Doc., pp.49-55.) She took full responsibility for
her role in the incident. (See Conf. Doc., pp.47-52.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982) (acceptance of responsibility as mitigation). In fact, the prosecutor commended her on her
honesty and noted that it was rare that the two versions of an incident align as they did in this
case. (Tr., p.54, L.19 – p.55, L.25.) See State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243 (Ct. App. 1986)
(cooperation with police as mitigating factor). Mr. Young even requested that the district court
show leniency and consider probation for Ms. Jolley. (Conf. Doc., p.30.)
While Ms. Jolley has substance abuse issues, she is aware of those issues, recognizes that
she needs, and wants, treatment. (Conf. Doc., pp.17, 79.) See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91
(1982) (defendant’s substance abuse problem as mitigation). The GAIN-1 report recommended
she participate in Level 1 outpatient treatment (Conf. Doc., pp.22, 88), and Ms. Jolley was
accepted into drug court. (Tr., p. 65, L.2.) See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (suggested
alternatives for treating substance abuse problem as mitigation). Further, Ms. Jolley
demonstrated, while on pre-trial release, that she can be successful and productive in the
community if on probation. (Tr., p.49, L.16 – p.50, L.2.) The fact that she was compliant on pretrial release and accepted to drug court provides strong evidence that she is capable of
overcoming her substance abuse while on probation.
Lastly, despite her young age, cross-country moves, and substance abuse issues,
Ms. Jolley has a solid work history. (Tr., p.20, Ls.14-15, p.21, Ls. 1-7) According to Mr. Young,
Ms. Jolley had a job lined up if she was released on probation. (Conf. Doc., p.30.) In the event
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that did not work out, her father stated that she could work on his farm until she secured a stable
job. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-7.) See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful
employment as a mitigating factor); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982)
(employment as mitigating circumstance).
Ms. Jolley contends proper consideration of all the mitigating factors warranted probation
or a more lenient sentence. Therefore, Ms. Jolley submits the district court did not exercise
reason, and thus abused its discretion, by imposing an excessive sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Jolley’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
If a sentence is within the statutory limits, then the request is a plea for leniency and is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2006). As noted
above, in determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate review centers on whether the
trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.” Bodenbach, 165 Idaho at 591. “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must
show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
In support of her Rule 35 motion, Ms. Jolley submitted letters from friends and family, as
well as her mental health records. (R., pp.158-59.) The letters of support are from Ms. Jolley’s
father (R., p.161), grandmother (R., p.162), mother (R., p.163), sister (R., p.164), and high
school friend. (R., p.165.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (family support
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and good character as mitigation); State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district
court considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstance). Eric Jolley, Ms. Jolley’s
father, wrote about his daughter’s caring nature and her willingness to help those in need.
(R., p.161.) Gwendolyn Barrington, her mother, wrote of Ms. Jolley’s positive attitude and how
she is a “source of strength” to both Gwendolyn and Ms. Jolley’s brother. (R., p.163.) Shoshanna
Norton, her sister, wrote that Ms. Jolley looks to the “brighter side” and “her gentle kindness is
missed.” (R., p.164.) Abigail Yanko, Ms. Jolley’s high school friend, wrote that Ms. Jolley has
been “used and abused” but “somehow shes [sic] always been supportive and sweet” and
“incredibly caring and kind.” (R., p.165.) This additional information of her good character
provides strong mitigation in favor of probation or a more lenient sentence.
In addition, Ms. Jolley’s mental health records reveal a long history of mental health
issues, self-harm, and suicidal ideations. (See R., pp.168-77.) While these records were attached
to Ms. Jolley’s motion for release on her own recognizance (R., p.79), taken in combination with
the compelling letters of support mentioned above, they provide powerful evidence in favor of
probation and/or a lesser sentence. This is particularly true when these records are viewed in
combination with the abundance of mitigating evidence present at the initial sentencing.
Ms. Jolley submits that in light of the additional information provided to the court the
district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motion. Therefore, the district court
failed to exercise reason in denying her Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Jolley respectfully requests that her case be remanded to the district court with an
order that she be placed on probation. Alternatively, she requests this Court reduce her sentence
as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2020.

/s/ Emily M. Joyce
EMILY M. JOYCE
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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